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ERICA HOWARD*
Race and Racism – Why does European Law
have Difficulties with Definitions?
Abstract: Within Europe, a number of legislative instruments provide protec-
tion against racism and race/racial discrimination, but definitions of the terms
race and racism are mostly absent from these instruments. This paper examines
the different terms used in the different instruments and the definitions given.
Particular attention is given to the question as to whether the grounds mentioned
can be extended to cover discrimination based on race/racial or ethnic origin,
colour, descent, nationality, national origin and religion or belief. Another ques-
tion discussed is whether common definitions/interpretations of the terms race,
racism and racial discrimination should exist in Europe and, if so, from which
source these should be drawn. 
1. INTRODUCTION
A number of legislative measures within greater Europe1 and within the
European Union (EU) prohibit racism and racial discrimination. Within
greater Europe, the prohibition can be found in instruments from the
Council of Europe, an organization, established in 1949, which focuses
on the protection of fundamental rights. It has 47 Member States, includ-
ing all the EU Member States. In 1950, the Council of Europe adopted
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). This Convention contains a prohibition
of discrimination in Article 14.
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Since the adoption of the Race Directive2 in 2000, the EU has had a
legislative prohibition of racial discrimination. In April 2007, the EU also
reached political agreement on the Proposal for a Council Framework
Decision on combating Racism and Xenophobia.3
This paper gives an overview of the prohibition of racism and racial
discrimination in the European measures. It examines the different terms
used in these instruments and their definitions. Particular attention is
given to the question as to whether the grounds mentioned can be extend-
ed to cover discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, colour, descent,
nationality, national origin and religion or belief. The paper provides an
answer to the question as to whether common definitions/interpretations
should be used and, if so, from which source they should be drawn.
2. MEASURES PROHIBITING RACISM/RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE
Article 14 of the ECHR reads:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
Not only does this article mention an extensive number of grounds, but
the terms ‘any ground such as’ and ‘or other status’ indicate that the list
is open-ended and can be further extended through case law. 
However, Article 14 does not give an independent, freestanding right
to non-discrimination as it only secures ‘the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention’ without discrimination. Therefore,
6 SPRING 2008
2 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between
Persons irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin [2000] OJ L 180/22 (hereafter: the Race
Directive).
3 Hereafter referred to as the Framework Decision. The proposal for this Decision is: COM
(2001) 664, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and
Xenophobia. Since important amendments have been made to the original proposal, the
European Parliament must be consulted again. ‘The Council will subsequently assess the
European Parliament’s observations before formally adopting the framework decision’,
Press Release: EU: Common Criminal Provisions Against Racism and Xenophobia,
20/04/2007, <www.eu2007.de/en/News/Press_Releases/April/0420BMJRassismus.html>.
For the Decision as it stands now see: Note from the Presidency to the Council of the
European Union, DROIPEN 34, 8544/07, 17/04/2007,
<www.timworstall.typepad.com/timworstall/files/droipen_34_latest.pdf >.
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discrimination can only be challenged in relation to the other Convention
rights. To overcome this problem, the Council of Europe adopted, in
2000, an Additional Protocol 12 to the ECHR which provides an inde-
pendent, freestanding right to non-discrimination in Article 1(1): ‘The
enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrim-
ination on any grounds such as …’ and then it mentions the same grounds
as Article 14 ECHR.4 Like the list in Article 14, the list in Protocol 12 is
also open-ended and both instruments prohibit racial discrimination.
In 1993, the Council of Europe established the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). This monitoring
body has as task to ‘combat racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intol-
erance at the level of greater Europe’.5 ECRI’s action covers ‘all neces-
sary measures to combat violence, discrimination and prejudice faced by
persons or groups of persons, notably on grounds of “race”, colour, lan-
guage, religion, nationality and national or ethnic origin’.6 Therefore,
ECRI focuses specifically on the fight against racism and racial discrim-
ination in greater Europe. One of its tasks is to adopt General Policy
Recommendations. For this article, General Policy Recommendation 7,7
on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, is
important. Adopted in December 2002, it recommends that Member
States enact legislation against racism and racial discrimination, if such
legislation does not already exist or is incomplete; and that they ensure
that the key components set out in the Recommendation are included in
such legislation.
Within the EU, the Race Directive puts a duty on the EU Member
States to put in place national legislation against discrimination on the 
SPRING 2008 7
4 To date (September 2007), Protocol 12 has been signed and ratified by 15 Council of
Europe Member States, five of which are also Member States of the EU (Cyprus,
Finland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Romania). 
5 Article 1 of the Statute of ECRI, <www.coe.int/ecri>.
6 ECRI and its Programme of Activities, CRI (1999) 53 rev. 6, 1, www.coe.int/ecri>under
‘Presentation of ECRI’.
7 General Policy Recommendation No. 7, On National Legislation to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination, CRI (2003) 8 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2003) (This
includes the Explanatory Memorandum).
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grounds of racial or ethnic origin in a wide number of areas.8 The
Framework Decision is a criminal law measure providing for ‘minimum
harmonization of the criminal provisions to combat racism and xenopho-
bia’ across the EU and covering ‘a person or group of persons defined by
reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin’.9
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union10 states,
in Article II-80, that ‘everyone is equal before the law’ and contains a
clear prohibition of discrimination on an extensive number of grounds in
Article II-81:
1) Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, member-
ship of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or
sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2) Within the scope of application of the Constitution and
without prejudice to any of its specific provisions any dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.
The legal status of the Charter is to be decided at the next
Intergovernmental Conference. The Presidency Conclusions of the
Council Meeting in Brussels in June 2007 contain a Draft ICG mandate
which states that the ‘Article on fundamental rights will contain a cross-
reference to the Charter … giving it legally binding value and setting out
the scope of its application’.11
One more measure needs to be mentioned: the International
Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
8 SPRING 2008
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8 A similar duty exists for discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion or belief, disabil-
ity, age and sexual orientation (although these duties do not cover all the areas covered
by the Race Directive). See: Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the Implementation of
the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to
Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions [1976] OJ
L39/40; Council Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC [2002]
OJ L269/15; Council Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment between Men and Women in the Access to and the Supply of Goods and
Services [2004] OJ L373/37; Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a General
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16
(hereafter, the latter is referred to as the Employment Equality Directive).
9 See Press Release, op. cit., n. 3.
10 Hereafter referred to as the EU Charter. For the complete text see: <http://europa.eu.int/
eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en00410054.pdf>. 
11 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 21-22/06/2007, Annex I: Draft
ICG Mandate, point 9 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data
/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf>. 
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(ICERD). Although the ICERD is not limited to (greater) Europe, it is
important because it deals specifically with racial discrimination and
because most European States, including all EU Member States, have
signed and ratified this Convention. Article 1 ICERD contains a prohibi-
tion of ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin’.
Therefore, in Europe, a number of measures exist against racism,
xenophobia and intolerance and race/racial or ethnic origin. But do these
instruments provide any definitions of these terms? 
3. RACE
Article 14 ECHR, Protocol 12, the EU Charter, the Framework Decision
and the ICERD all prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race. The
Race Directive combats discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic
origin or, as in some language versions, race or ethnic origin.12 And the
task of ECRI includes combating racism and discrimination based on
race. But none of these instruments provide a definition of the term race
and neither does the Statute of ECRI.
The reason for this might be that defining race is not easy. The liter-
ature on the subject suggests13 that the term is changing over time, that it
is not a static concept with a single meaning. It has had different mean-
ings in different historical settings and we will therefore have to look,
very briefly, at this history.14
The term race was hardly used before the eighteenth century, but
when it was used it denoted nothing more than a group of people with a
common line of descent, a common ancestry. When people came into
SPRING 2008 9
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12 A. Tyson, ‘The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial
Discrimination’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 3, 2001, pp. 199-229, at
p. 201.
13 See, for example, M. Banton, Racial and Ethnic Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); R. Benedict, Race and Racism (London: Routhledge & Kegan
Paul, 1983); R. Miles, Racism (London/New York: Routledge, 1989); M. Banton, ‘The
Nature and Causes of Racism and Racial Discrimination’, International Sociology, Vol.
17, No. 1, 1992, pp. 69-84; J. Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (Basingstoke:
MacMillan, 2nd edn, 1993); D. Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995); F. Furedi, The Silent War: Imperialism and the
Changing Perception of Race (London: Pluto Press, 1998); M. Bulmer and J. Solomos
(eds), Racism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); M. Banton, The International
Politics of Race (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
14 For reasons of space, this look at the history is necessarily very short. For more infor-
mation on the history of the terms race and racism, the reader is referred to the authors
in n.13.
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contact with other people, race was used as a term to relate to these other
people and to define themselves in relation to these other people. Race
thus denoted observed variations between people.
Not until the eighteenth century did race become a biological term,
a subject of the biological sciences. The world was seen as populated by
distinct races, each with different biological and cultural characteristics.
This biological distinction became linked to a hierarchy between the
races, with some races being considered superior to others. This inferior-
ity/superiority was used to justify exclusion, subordination and even
extermination of certain groups considered to be inferior. Many people
argue that race was used or ‘reinvented’ with this ranking attached to it to
explain events in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries like white dom-
ination, colonization, slavery and other forms of exploitation.15
Scientists in the 1930s disproved the theories about biological differ-
ences and most writers, after World War II, acknowledge that there is no
scientific evidence to support any theory that there are different, separate,
biological races. However, biological notions of race do still appear to be
present in political discourse and popular thinking. The term is still used
in everyday language to label differences between people, especially dif-
ferences in skin colour.16
Race, therefore, has been and still is connected to the idea of a hierar-
chy between races. The hierarchy meant that some races were considered to
be inferior and this has led to inferior treatment of people of certain races.
Connected to the fact that race is historically specific and should
therefore be studied within the society in which it is used is the view that
race is a social relationship and a social construct. Race is created in a
particular society to justify differences in treatment or in position. 
Race is thus a fluid concept changing over time and indeed changing
with the use a person makes of it. It is suggested that there are no supe-
rior or inferior races, but that large numbers of people behave as if there
are. In this sense, it is not relevant whether races exist or not, but it is
important to observe that social actors treat races as real and organize
their lives and exclusionary practices by reference to this. When studying
race as a ground for discrimination, the perception in the minds of peo-
ple is important; they discriminate against another person because they
perceive him/her to be different and therefore inferior or threatening. In
its everyday meaning, race is still often based on a difference between
races, although these differences can be biological, cultural or both.
10 SPRING 2008
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15 See, for example: Miles and Furedi, op. cit., n. 13. 
16 See Miles, at 37-38; Banton (1992), at 78; Solomos, at 8; Mason, at 7; C. Guillaumin,
‘The Changing Face of Race’ in: Bulmer and Solomos, at pp. 355-362, all op. cit., n.13. 
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The terms ethnicity or ethnic origin are often used together with,17 or
as an alternative to, race or racial origin. It is difficult to draw a bound-
ary between the concepts of ethnicity and race as they overlap in many
aspects. It is suggested that the terms ethnic and ethnicity, when coupled
with race, are used to clarify that cultural traits are also included. When
used instead of race, it is often as a euphemism, to avoid the negative
implications that the word race has. Ethnic and ethnicity are less nega-
tively loaded.
Before we analyse the term race as it appears in the measures men-
tioned, we will examine the term racism because the two terms are close-
ly linked.
4. RACISM
Like race, racism is difficult to define. Racism is also not a static phenom-
enon but is historically specific: it has to be studied in its historical and
geographical setting. Although the history of notions about race can be
traced back to ancient times, most writers place the emergence of what we
now call racism at the end of the eighteenth century. That is when racial
doctrines and ideologies began to develop. Most writers link this emer-
gence to processes of European expansion, slavery, colonization and dom-
ination, which could all be seen as institutions of white supremacy. Racist
theories, doctrines that some races – i.e. the white race – were superior,
were used to rationalize why white people should exploit black people.
The development of racism was linked with processes of economic expan-
sion and capitalist development which were happening at the same time.18
Although racism emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, the
term itself did not gain common currency until much later. The usage of
the term is linked to the rise of Nazism in the 1930s. Prior to that decade
the concept of racism was not used to identify theories about the superi-
ority of certain races and the inferiority of others. 
Racism is based on the belief that some races are superior to others. If
it can be said that race has a negative link to such a hierarchy, it will be clear
that this link is very much stronger with racism. The concept is, in Miles’
words ‘heavily negatively loaded. To claim someone has expressed a racist
opinion is to denounce them as immoral or unworthy’.19 Racism, therefore,
has a strong negative connotation, and is often seen as socially unacceptable. 
SPRING 2008 11
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19 Op. cit., n. 13, at p. 1.
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Connected with its historically specific character is the fact that
racism, like race, has been described as a social construct, as something
that has been created within a society to justify inequality and to protect
the political and economic interests of those who discriminate. Racism as
it exists in modern-day society might not always be based on biological
differences. Social and cultural differences are also used to differentiate
between people, sometimes because biological differences have been
rejected by science. But, as mentioned, ideas about biological differences
are still widespread and are often at the basis of ideas about cultural and
social differences.
The term xenophobia is often used coupled together with racism,
especially within Europe.20 Xenophobia appears to indicate a dislike or
fear of foreigners and all things foreign. The term xenophobia is, howev-
er, also often used as a euphemism for racism, because of the negative
connotation of racism and the links between racism and fascism and the
holocaust. As Spencer writes:21
Xenophobia … implies an irrational but more excusable senti-
ment, capable of being expressed as much by jokes about for-
eigners as by violent expressions of hatred. … In practice the
two words express aspects of the same thing: a mistrust and fear
of any person whose language, culture or appearance is different
to that of the majority, allied with a conviction that one’s own
‘race’, nation or culture is superior to any other.
Racism thus appears to be an even more contested and more negatively
loaded concept than race, but both terms have a negative connotation. 
The memory of the Holocaust and the abuse of theories about race
made under Nazism in Germany were casting long shadows over the
debates in the EU and wider Europe and, therefore, the use of the terms
race and racism were and still are very sensitive for many European
states. For example, during the negotiations about the Race Directive, the
EU Member States faced ‘a conundrum: how to speak about ‘race’ in a
Directive which fights racism’, as Tyson writes.22 The negotiations show
12 SPRING 2008
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20 See the mandate of ECRI and for the EU: Joint Declaration of the Institutions against
Racism and Xenophobia [1986] OJ C 158/1; Declaration by the Council on Respecting
Diversity and Combating Racism and Xenophobia [1998] OJ C 1/1; The institution set
up to monitor racism was called the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and
Xenophobia. (This has now become the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights).
21 M. Spencer, States of Injustice. A Guide to Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the
European Union, London/Boulder Colorado: Pluto Press, 1995, at p. 127.
22 Op. cit., n. 12, at p. 201.
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clearly that some Member States saw the use of the term race as ‘tanta-
mount to accepting racist theories that alleged the existence of separate
human races’. However, other Member States wanted to use the word
race rather than solely relying on ethnic origin in order to make clear that
the Directive was combating racism. The compromise that was reached
was the addition of a Recital 6 to the Preamble stating that the EU rejects
theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human
races; and, that the use of the term racial origin in the Directive does not
imply an acceptance of such theories.
In the Preamble of the ICERD, the States Parties also reject theories
of racial superiority by stating that they are ‘convinced that any doctrine
of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, moral-
ly condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justi-
fication for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere’. In
ECRI Recommendation 723 a footnote, added to para 1(a), states: ‘since
all human beings belong to the same species, ECRI rejects theories based
on the existence of different “races”’. (Note the use of “race” in quota-
tions marks!) While the ICERD dates from 1966, the Race Directive and
the Recommendation were both adopted since 2000, but the European
States still found it necessary even then to state their rejection explicitly! 
Although none of the instruments defines race, some do give a def-
inition of racism. The original proposal for the Framework Decision24
defined, in its Article 3(a), ‘racism and xenophobia’ as meaning ‘the
belief in race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin
as a factor determining aversion to individuals or groups’. The two EU
measures aiming to combat racism, therefore, covered different aspects
of racism. During the negotiations on the Proposal for the Framework
Decision, which have taken place since 2001, the text was amended con-
siderably and the text agreed upon in April 2007 is a much weakened ver-
sion of the original.25 The definition of racism has disappeared but the
Decision still covers race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic
origin (Article 1(a), (c) and (d)). Despite the change, the decision still
covers more than the Race Directive, which covers only race/racial or
ethnic origin, and the anomaly between the two measures remains. 
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24 COM (2001) 664, op. cit., n. 3.
25 DROIPEN 34, 8544/07, 17/04/2007, op. cit., n. 3.
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ECRI Recommendation 7 contains the following definition of
racism:
the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion,
nationality or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a
person or a group of persons, or the notion of superiority of a
person or a group of persons. 26
This definition is provided for the purposes of the Recommendation and
it is up to the States Parties to decide whether they want to include it in
their national law. In contrast to this, the definition of racial discrimina-
tion has to be included.27 Coomber28 makes an interesting point in rela-
tion to this ECRI definition when she writes that, in the drafting of other
international instruments, such as the ICERD and the Race Directive, the
drafters avoided defining racism. She continues: 
ECRI’s attempt at a definition indicates why it is perhaps wiser
to define unlawful conduct rather than ambiguous concepts
such as “racism”. Moreover, by linking such activities to an
ambiguous standard based on the ‘belief’ of the person,
Recommendation 7 introduces a concept that it is difficult for
any legal system to prosecute.
This suggests that it might be better for the legislator not to give a defi-
nition of racism, but to define racial discrimination only. It is submitted
that prosecuting a person for his/her beliefs is problematic not only
because it might be difficult to prove such beliefs, but, more important-
ly, because this would violate the fundamental human right to freedom of
thought. Moreover, legislation will prohibit the practical occurrences of
racism, such as (incitement to) racist violence, racist hate speech and
racial discrimination in employment and other areas of life, rather than
beliefs. 
14 SPRING 2008
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
26 Op. cit., n. 7, para 1(a). 
27 Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation, op. cit., n. 7, para 7. 
28 A. Coomber, ‘The Council of Europe: Combating Racism and Xenophobia’ in: R.
Nickel, A. Coomber, M. Bell, T. Hutchinson, and K. Zahi, European Strategies to
Combat Racism and Xenophobia as a Crime, Brussels: European Network Against
Racism (ENAR), 2003, pp. 17-26, at p. 23.
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5. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Racism and racial discrimination are sometimes taken to be almost syn-
onymous, because the term racism is often used to denote both beliefs
and ideologies and the behaviour based on these beliefs. However, some
writers define racism as beliefs, doctrines, views or ideologies and
specifically exclude the actions or behaviour based on those doctrines. If
a difference is made between the two terms, then racism is seen as an ide-
ology or doctrine, as a theory about the existence of different races and a
hierarchy between these races, while racial discrimination is seen as a
practice, as actions/behaviour based on racist beliefs and feelings. 
The term discrimination can be used in two different ways, firstly in
the sense of discriminating between and, secondly, in the sense of discrim-
inating against. ‘Discriminating between’ simply means making a distinc-
tion, but ‘discriminating against’ has a negative connotation. In everyday
use the negative meaning of the term appears to have gained ground over
the other meaning, and the term discrimination is thus more often than not
tied up with a moral judgment that discriminating is unfair or bad.
There are a number of definitions of discrimination in the instru-
ments mentioned in our introduction. Article 1(1) ICERD, for example,
states that the term ‘racial discrimination’ in the Convention shall mean:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultur-
al or any other field of public life. 
Article 2 of the Race Directive gives definitions of direct and indirect
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, similar to those used in
the EU in the sex discrimination field. Direct discrimination shall be
taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another
is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of
racial or ethnic origin (Article 2(a)). Indirect discrimination shall be
taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice
would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice
is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving
that aim are appropriate and necessary (Article 2(b)). The EU Charter
does not contain a definition of discrimination.
Para 1 of ECRI Recommendation 7 also defines both direct and indi-
rect discrimination. According to Para 1(b), direct racial discrimination
SPRING 2008 15
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shall mean differential treatment based on a ground such as race, colour,
language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin, which has no
objective and reasonable justification. The definition of indirect discrim-
ination in the recommendation is very similar to that of the Race
Directive. 
From the existence of these definitions, we can conclude that it
appears to be easier to define racial discrimination. It is suggested that
this is connected to the point raised by Coomber that it is easier to give a
definition of unlawful conduct than it is to give a definition of unlawful
beliefs. The instruments mentioned prohibit racial discrimination and,
therefore, define what should be understood by this term. 
6. RACIAL OR ETHNIC ORIGIN
The term ‘racial or ethnic origin’ or similar terms are also mentioned in
a number of instruments. Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12 mention,
among other grounds in their open-ended list, race, colour, religion and
national origin, while ECRI Recommendation 7 for national legislation
against racial discrimination includes race, colour, religion, nationality or
national or ethnic origin. Racial discrimination under the ICERD
includes discrimination based on race, colour, descent or national or eth-
nic origin. The EU Charter mentions, amongst other grounds, race,
colour, ethnic origin and religion or belief, and the Race Directive deals
with discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. But how do we
define race/racial or ethnic origin? The Race Directive has been widely
criticized in the literature for the omission of definitions of key terms.29
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According to Brown, the marked lack of key definitions ‘may create
uncertainty and generate a fair amount of litigation’.30
However, other documents within the EU, including the EU Charter,
appear to show the same lack of definitions of key terms. The only excep-
tion to this appears to have been the Proposal for the Framework
Decision, but, as mentioned, the definition of racism and xenophobia has
now been removed from that Decision. One explanation for the lack of
definition of key terms in the Race Directive might be that Article 13 EC,
which formed the basis for its adoption, requires unanimity in the
Council and it appears unlikely, from the problems about the wording
during the negotiations touched upon above, that unanimous agreement
about definitions of these terms could have been reached. The disappear-
ance of the definition from the Framework Decision during the negotia-
tions also suggests a lack of consensus among EU Member States.
But can ‘racial or ethnic origin’ in the Directive be taken to include
colour, nationality or descent? Brennan mentions that ‘a series of reports
on Northern Ireland consider that characteristically the principal trigger
for racially discriminatory behaviour is ‘skin colour racism’. The reports
show that ‘in Northern Ireland discriminators do not generally know the
ethnic or national background of victims’ but they tend to ‘discriminate
on the basis of ‘visible’ characteristics’.31 It could be argued that skin
colour is included as a ground in the Race Directive, as it is used as an
indication of a person’s racial or ethnic origin, and it is hoped that the
ECJ will decide that this is so. The fact that the EU Charter mentions both
race and colour could be used as an argument to support this. It can also
be argued that race/racial or ethnic origin include descent (or ancestry),
as mentioned when looking at the definition of race. But it would have
been clearer if the Directive itself had mentioned both colour and descent
as grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. The Framework
Decision states that descent ‘refers mainly to persons or groups of per-
sons who descend from persons who could be identified by certain char-
acteristics (such as race or colour)’.32 This and the fact that some of the
international instruments include colour and descent in the definition of
racial discrimination could also support the argument that these are
included in the Race Directive. It will, ultimately, be up to the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) to interpret the extent of ‘racial and ethnic origin’. 
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7. NATIONALITY AND NATIONAL ORIGIN
Before we discuss nationality and national origin as grounds for discrim-
ination, we must make it clear that a person’s nationality and his/her
national origin do not have to be the same. To illustrate this with an exam-
ple, a person with Dutch nationality can be discriminated against because
he/she is Dutch (nationality), or because he/she is from Indonesia
(national origin). Of course he/she could also be discriminated against
because he/she is darker-skinned (colour), because he/she is Moluccan
(ethnic origin) or because he/she is Muslim (religion). As already men-
tioned, perpetrators of discriminatory acts do not usually distinguish
between these grounds and are often led by visual characteristics. The
example shows that all these grounds for discrimination are closely relat-
ed and that it is often difficult to distinguish between them.
The ECHR, Protocol 12, the ICERD and ECRI Recommendation 7
all mention national origin, but the Recommendation is the only instru-
ment mentioning nationality as well. The ECHR, does, according to the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, also prohibit discrim-
ination on the grounds of nationality.33 The interpretation of Protocol 12
will most likely follow this interpretation and, therefore, both Article 14
ECHR and Protocol 12 can be said to prohibit discrimination on the
grounds of nationality and national origin. 
The ICERD mentions national origin, but not nationality. Does it
cover discrimination on the grounds of nationality as well? Article 1(2)
allows for distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, while Article
1(3) recognizes a State’s sovereignty in matters of nationality, citizenship
or naturalization, but does put a proviso on this: such provisions should
not discriminate against any particular nationality. This suggests that the
ICERD will allow for distinctions based on nationality. However, the
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination34
has brought out a General Recommendation on discrimination against
non-citizens in which it affirms that the protection against discrimination
covers, in principle, all persons and that the States Parties are under an
obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the
enjoyment of human rights. Point 1,4 of the Recommendation reads:
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizen-
ship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the
criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objec-
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tives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant
to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement
of this aim. …
Therefore, the ICERD does allow for distinctions based on nationality,
but these are circumscribed: differential treatment of non-citizens under
Article 1(2) will be considered discrimination unless it is objectively jus-
tified and Article 1(3) must not lead to discrimination against any partic-
ular nationality. 
The Race Directive does not mention either national origin or nation-
ality. Could these be said to be included under ‘race/racial or ethnic orig-
in’? In other words, does the Directive cover discrimination on the
ground of nationality or national origin? National origin is not mentioned
in the Directive at all, but there is an explicit exception for nationality in
Article 3(2), which also adds a further proviso:
This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on
nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions
relating to the entry into and residence of third-country nation-
als and stateless persons on the territory of the Member States,
and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the
third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned.
Recital 13 determines that discrimination under the directive ‘should be
prohibited throughout the Community’. It then adds:
This prohibition of discrimination should also apply to nationals
of third countries, but does not cover differences of treatment
based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions gov-
erning the entry and residence of third-country nationals and
their access to employment and to occupation.
The directive makes an exception for discrimination on grounds of
nationality, because, as the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for
the Race Directive states, ‘the Directive does not prohibit differences in
treatment based on nationality, which is dealt with by separate Articles of
the Treaty (in particular Articles 12 and 39) and by existing secondary
legislation’.35 But does it matter that the Directive does not cover nation-
ality discrimination, as Article 12 EC contains a prohibition of such dis-
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crimination? The answer to this must be that it does matter for two rea-
sons. Firstly, as already mentioned, it is not always easy to distinguish
between race/racial or ethnic origin discrimination and discrimination on
the grounds of nationality or national origin. Secondly, Article 12 has
always been held to apply to nationals of EU Member States only and
thus does not protect third-country nationals – nationals of other than EU
Member States – against nationality discrimination. On top of this, the
second part of Article 3(2) of the Race Directive also appears to limit the
protection afforded to third-country nationals against racial discrimina-
tion in certain areas (provisions and conditions relating to entry and res-
idence and legal status). 
Article 3(2) and Recital 13 were not present in either the original or
the amended proposals, but were added as a compromise during the
negotiations on the Race Directive because some Member States were
concerned about preserving their immigration and asylum systems.
These Member States were not satisfied with the Commission’s argument
that admission policies were not included in the material scope of the
Directive.36 The exception in Article 3(2) reflects the fact that it is up to
a state to decide on whether to admit a person to its territory and whether
to give him/her a residence or work permit, as this is a power of the
Member State and not of the Community. However, Article 3(2) has been
severely criticized in the literature and many writers have called for a nar-
row interpretation of this paragraph, because a broad interpretation
would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the directive for third-country
nationals, who are often the main target of racial and nationality discrim-
ination.37
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As mentioned, Article II-81(1) of the EU Charter prohibits discrimi-
nation on a large number of grounds. From the use of the words ‘any
ground such as’ it will be clear that this is a non-exhaustive or open-ended
list and that other grounds could be recognized through case law. Although
this list is very extensive, it does not contain any reference to nationality
or national origin, unlike Article 14 ECHR, upon which it draws.
Discrimination on grounds of nationality is instead covered by the second
paragraph, which according to the Updated Explanations to the EU
Charter ‘corresponds to Article I-4(2) of the Constitution and must be
applied in compliance with that Article’.38Article I-4(2) echoes the pres-
ent Article 12 EC, and, therefore, it is likely that the interpretation of this
article and Article II-81(2) will follow the interpretation given to Article
12 EC. This suggests that the EU Charter, although it does explicitly pro-
hibit nationality discrimination in Article II-81(2), does not extend the
protection against such discrimination to third country nationals.
Neither the Race Directive nor the EU Charter mentions national ori-
gin as a ground for discrimination. It will be up to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) to decide on this. On the one hand, it could decide that
national origin falls under race/racial or ethnic origin. The inclusion of
national origin in the Framework Decision and in the international instru-
ments – signed by all EU Member States – providing protection against
discrimination can be used as an argument for such a decision. Such an
interpretation would also have the advantage that no distinction needs to
be made between national origin and race/racial or ethnic origin. On the
other hand, the ECJ could interpret nationality in the Race Directive and
in the EU Charter as including national origin. This would mean that the
Directive would not cover national origin, but that Article II-81(2) would
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cover this, although the next question for the ECJ to decide would then
be whether protection against national origin discrimination was limited
to those who had their national origin in an EU Member State. 
8. RELIGION OR BELIEF
This ground for discrimination is also discussed because the ECHR,
Protocol 12, ECRI, the EU Charter and the EU Framework Decision all
provide protection against discrimination on this ground. ECRI and the
Proposal for the Framework Decision actually include religion in their
definitions of race and racism, while the Framework Decision as adopt-
ed in 2007, which aims to combat racism and xenophobia, covers religion
as well. The ICERD and the Race Directive are exceptions, as neither
mentions religion. Apart from the Framework Decision, none of the
measures give a definition of religion. Recital 5c of the Preamble of the
Framework Decision39 states that ‘religion broadly refers to persons
defined by reference to their religious convictions or beliefs’. What must
be understood by ‘religious convictions or beliefs’ is not further defined.
Does this, for example, include philosophical beliefs? 
The Race Directive covers discrimination on the grounds of racial or
ethnic origin and does not mention religion or belief but the Employment
Equality Directive does, so EU law does provide protection against dis-
crimination based on religion or belief. It seems, therefore, unimportant
that the Race Directive does not. However, the protection provided
against discrimination by the Race Directive is more extensive than the
protection provided by the Employment Equality Directive for three rea-
sons: firstly, the Race Directive has a much wider material scope: both
Directives cover access to employment; access to training; employment
conditions; and, membership of professional organizations. But the Race
Directive also covers social protection, including social security and
health care; social advantages; education; and, access to and supply of
goods and services which are available to the public, including housing.40
In other words, the scope of the Employment Equality Directive is limit-
ed to the field of employment and occupation, while the Race Directive
goes beyond that. 
Secondly, the Race Directive only allows for two specifically men-
tioned exceptions: for genuine and determining occupational require-
ments (Article 4) and for positive action measures (Article 5). Direct
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racial or ethnic origin discrimination cannot be justified under any other
circumstances. The Employment Equality Directive also allows for these
exceptions (Articles 4(1) and 7, respectively), but it provides for a num-
ber of additional ones: Article 2(5) gives an additional general exception;
Article 4(2) contains an exception for occupational activities of organiza-
tions with a religious ethos; Article 5 prescribes that reasonable accom-
modation must be made for disabled persons; Article 6 provides for a
general justification and a number of exceptions in relation to age; and,
Article 15 makes exceptions for the police service and for teachers in
Northern Ireland. 
Thirdly, the Race Directive makes it easier for victims to bring a case
for discrimination because of the enforcement support it provides. Both
Directives put a duty on Member States to make judicial and/or adminis-
trative procedures available to all persons who feel discriminated against.
Both also provide that associations and organizations can support victims
in bringing actions.41 But only the Race Directive (in Article 13) puts a
duty on Member States to ‘designate a body or bodies for the promotion
of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on the grounds
of racial or ethnic origin’.
This difference in protection and especially the limitation of the
material scope of the Framework Directive to the employment sphere
might create a loophole: perpetrators could claim that they discriminate
against victims because of their religion rather than because of their
racial or ethnic origin and so evade legal action. As ENAR states in the
General Policy Paper on religious discrimination:42 
Religion or belief are often used to justify racial discrimination,
and can be used to obscure racist motivations. This reality is
compounded by the fact that the perpetrators of racist acts do not
necessarily distinguish between nationality, culture or religious
background.
The European Parliament appears to have been aware of this problem as
it suggested the following addition to Article 2 of the Race Directive:
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Discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin which is
presented as a difference in treatment on the grounds of religion,
conviction or nationality is deemed to be discrimination within
the meaning of Article 1.43
It seems that the EU and its Member States are aware of this problem too
as Article 1(1b) of the Framework Decision determines that:
For the purpose of paragraph 1, the reference to religion is
intended to cover, at least, conduct which is a pretext for direct-
ing acts against a group of persons or a member of such a group
defined by reference to race, colour, descent, or national or eth-
nic origin. 
Does this also indicate that the EU and the Member States are aware that
it is difficult to distinguish between race/racial or ethnic origin and reli-
gion or belief as grounds for discrimination? 
This brings us to the other reason why it does matter that the Race
Directive omits religion or belief from the grounds covered: racial dis-
crimination may be interwoven with discrimination on grounds of a per-
son’s adherence to a (minority) religion or ethnicity. Therefore, it is often
difficult to draw a clear and precise line between race/racial or ethnic ori-
gin and religion or belief. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that discriminators more
often than not do not distinguish clearly between race, colour, descent,
religion, nationality or national origin when they discriminate and that
their behaviour may spring from any one or more or all of these causes,
as will be clear form the discussion so far and especially from the
Reports Brennan writes about (quoted above): ‘that discriminators do not
generally know the ethnic or national background of the victim’44 and the
quote from ENAR ‘that the perpetrators of racist acts do not necessarily
distinguish between nationality, culture or religious background’.45 
Will the inclusion of religion or belief in Article II-81(1) of the EU
Charter make a difference once the Charter becomes legally binding? The
Updated Explanations to the Charter46 explain that there is no contradic-
tion or incompatibility between Article 21(1) and Article [III-8] of the
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Draft Constitution.47 Article [III-8], which corresponds to the present
Article 13 EC, has a different scope and purpose. The Explanations con-
tinue:
Article [III-8] of the Constitution confers power on the Union to
adopt legislative acts … to combat certain forms of discrimina-
tion, listed exhaustively in that Article. Such legislation may
cover action of Member State authorities (as well as relations
between individuals)… In contrast, the provision in paragraph 1
does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in
these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay
down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging
areas. Instead, it only addresses discrimination by the institu-
tions and bodies of the Union themselves, … and by the Member
States only when they are implementing Union law. Paragraph 1
therefore does not alter the extent of the powers granted under
Article [III-8] nor the interpretation given to that Article.
As Article III-124 corresponds to Article 13 EC, the same explanation
can be used to distinguish between Article II-81(1) and Article 13 EC.
Therefore, Article II-81(1) addresses discrimination by the institutions of
the Union and by the Member States when they are implementing Union
law, while Article 13 EC and the directives enacted under this Article also
prohibit discrimination on the listed grounds by the Member States and
by individuals. The protection given by the EU Charter against discrimi-
nation is thus much narrower than that provided by the Race and
Employment Equality Directives and the inclusion of religion or belief in
the Charter will not extend the protection against discrimination on these
grounds beyond what is provided by the Employment Equality Directive.
9. COMMON DEFINITIONS/INTERPRETATIONS?
The EU Member States must provide at least the protection given by the
Race and Employment Equality Directives, but these directives contain
minimum requirements only48 and, therefore, the States are free to go
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beyond the provisions of the directives. The same is true for the Council
of Europe Member States when following ECRI Recommendation 7.49
Therefore, all European States could provide definitions of the terms
race, racism and racial or ethnic origin discrimination in their national
laws against race discrimination and they could include colour, descent,
nationality, national origin and religion or belief as protected grounds. 
But should the Member States provide definitions of these terms?
And if the answer is yes, should common definitions and interpretations
exist for the whole of Europe? And, again, if the answer is yes, from
which source should these be drawn? It is submitted that the terms race
and racism should not be defined because of the problem of defining
these concepts in a way that would be useful in law. Instead the national
legislative measures should define discrimination and either explicitly
mention all the grounds covered by the legislation; or, they should
include ‘any grounds such as’ and/or ‘or other status’ to indicate that the
list is open-ended and can be extended through the case law. If all the
grounds covered are explicitly mentioned, only the legislator can add
other grounds. 
The general anti-discrimination instruments all give an open-ended
list of grounds, but the measures specifically targeting racism and racial
discrimination – the ICERD, ECRI Recommendation 7, the Framework
Decision and the Race Directive – all use the second alternative. The lat-
ter leaves less scope for the courts, although they can still be called upon
to interpret the grounds mentioned. For example, the ECJ might well
interpret race/racial or ethnic origin in the Race Directive as including
colour and descent because these are so closely related to race/racial or
ethnic origin. However, the ECJ could not expand the coverage of the
Race Directive to nationality and/or religion or belief, because the EU
legislator has specifically excluded nationality discrimination and pro-
vided for protection against discrimination based on religion or belief in
a different instrument. 
A Europe-wide, common legislative definition of racial discrimina-
tion would provide the strongest protection for all people in the whole of
Europe, especially if it drew on the Race Directive’s definitions of direct
and indirect discrimination. The directive’s definitions of these concepts
are preferred over those of ECRI Recommendation 7, because the former,
as mentioned, do not allow for justification of direct discrimination except
in two specifically mentioned cases, while the latter allows for objective
and reasonable justification of both direct and indirect discrimination. 
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National legislation against race/racial discrimination should draw
for the grounds covered by such legislation on the ECRI
Recommendation, so that race, colour, religion, nationality, national and
ethnic origin are all covered. For the EU Member States, the latter can
only be achieved by legislative amendment of the Directive but it remains
to be seen whether the EU Member States can reach a unanimous deci-
sion on such an amendment. The present situation in (greater) Europe
does, however, leave significant gaps in the protection of third-country
nationals against race and nationality discrimination. 
10. CONCLUSION
In this article we have analysed what is covered by the diverse measures
against racism and racial discrimination within greater Europe and we
have included the ICERD in this because this UN measure against racial
discrimination is signed and ratified by most European States and is thus
influential.
We can conclude that there is a distinct lack of definitions of the term
race in all these measures, while racism is defined only in the ECRI
Recommendation and in the Proposal for the Framework Decision. The
latter definition is, however, not present in the Framework Decision as
adopted in 2007. We briefly looked at the terms race and racism and con-
cluded that both are difficult terms to define, which might explain the
lack of definitions of these terms in the instruments mentioned. 
The term discrimination, on the other hand, appears to be defined in
most measures. This could be because, firstly, it is what most of the
measures aim to combat and thus are directly involved with. And, second-
ly, because it is an easier term to define, because it refers to acts, prac-
tices and behaviour based on racist views and ideologies. Not only are
people’s inner beliefs and thoughts more difficult to ascertain and to
prove, they are also more difficult to legislate against.
The international measures all prohibit discrimination based on
race/racial or ethnic origin, but do not define these terms. We suggested
that discrimination based on colour and descent would be included in
these terms, as they are closely related to race/racial and ethnic origin.
Colour is usually used as an indicator of race/racial or ethnic origin.
Apart from the Race Directive, all the measures do include colour and the
Framework Decision and the ICERD do also include descent. 
We next looked at nationality and national origin, grounds that are
mentioned in some of the instruments. National origin appears to be
included in all measures apart from the Race Directive, but the situation
is different when we look at nationality. The ECHR, Protocol 12, ECRI’s
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mandate and Recommendation 7 both cover nationality discrimination as
well as national origin discrimination. The ICERD makes exceptions for
some forms of discrimination on the ground of nationality, but these
exceptions are circumscribed and are to be interpreted narrowly. 
Nationality discrimination is also prohibited within the EU, but not
through the Race Directive, which, in its Article 3(2), explicitly exempts
nationality from its coverage. Instead, Article 12 EC prohibits discrimi-
nation on the grounds of nationality. The EU Charter seems to follow the
same pattern: it prohibits discrimination in Article II-81(1) and then men-
tions nationality separately in Article II-81(2). The main problem is that
Article 12 EC has always been interpreted as only covering discrimina-
tion based on the nationality of one of the EU Member States which
means that third country nationals are not protected against nationality
discrimination by this Article. This does not appear to change when the
EU Charter will become legally enforceable, because the interpretation
of Article II-81(2) will most likely follow that of Article 12 EC.
The last ground of discrimination examined is religion or belief. This
ground is covered by the prohibition of discrimination in all instruments
except in the ICERD and the Race Directive. Within the EU, it is instead
covered by the Employment Equality Directive, but because there are dif-
ferences in strength between the latter directive and the Race Directive,
the protection provided against discrimination on the grounds of religion
or belief is not as extensive as that provided against race/racial or ethnic
origin discrimination, which could lead to problems. 
The ECHR, Protocol 12 and Article II-81 of the EU Charter are gen-
eral anti-discrimination measures rather than specifically prohibiting dis-
crimination on grounds of race/racial or ethnic origin, but the ICERD,
ECRI Recommendation 7, and, within the EU, the Framework Decision
and the Race Directive specifically target racism and racial discrimina-
tion. Of these instruments, the coverage of the Race Directive is the nar-
rowest, but this could be explained by the fact that it also provides the
strongest protection. The Race Directive puts a clear, legally enforceable
duty on EU Member States to enact legislation against discrimination (as
does the Employment Equality Directive), while the Framework Decision
aims to harmonize criminal law approaches to racism and xenophobia ‘in
order to ensure that the same behaviour constitutes an offence in all
Member States and that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions
are provided for natural and legal persons having committed or being
liable for such offences’. The Preamble of the Framework Decision rec-
ognizes that ‘since the Member States’ cultural and legal traditions are, 
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to some extent, different, particularly in this field, full harmonization of
criminal laws is currently not possible’.50
Therefore, the directives go much further and have much greater
implications for the legislation of the EU Member States than the
Framework Decision. It is thus likely to be more difficult to reach unan-
imous agreement on any changes to the directives. The difference in force
between ECRI Recommendation 7 and the directives is even greater.
Whereas the Directives are binding on the EU Member States, which
have a legal duty to implement them and can be taken to the ECJ when
not doing so, the Recommendation has no binding legal force, it merely
advises the Member States of the Council of Europe to put effective leg-
islation against racism and racial discrimination in place. The EU
Directives are thus backed up by legal sanctions for non-compliance,
while the Recommendation has no such backup, the pressure on Council
of Europe Member States is more political in nature, and ECRI can exert
it via its periodical country reports, in which it often criticizes govern-
ments for not taking (sufficient) action.
The European measures do not prevent the States of greater Europe
from providing definitions of the terms race, racism, race discrimination
and racial or ethnic origin in their national laws against race discrimina-
tion and they could include colour, descent, nationality, national origin
and religion or belief as protected grounds. 
We have argued that national legislation should not define race and
racism because definitions that would be useful in law are difficult to
provide. Instead, national law should define racial discrimination, draw-
ing on the Race Directive’s definitions of direct and indirect discrimina-
tion and drawing on ECRI Recommendation 7 for the grounds covered
by such legislation, so that race, colour, religion, nationality, national and
ethnic origin are all covered. 
As the present situation in (greater) Europe does leave significant
gaps in the protection of third-country nationals against race and nation-
ality discrimination, a Europe-wide, common, legislative definition of
racial discrimination drawing on the Race Directive and ECRI
Recommendation 7 as advocated would provide the strongest protection
for all people in the whole of Europe.
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